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Aesthetics?
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abstract  The answer to the question posed in the title is by no means obvi-
ous. That we need to protect our environment has indeed become evident. 
But what, if anything, does aesthetics have to contribute towards meeting 
that need? Looking at aesthetics, as it has evolved ever since Baumgarten, the 
answer would seem to be: very little. Environmental concerns, important as 
they are, would seem to have no place in aesthetics, so understood. Is there 
then any reason for those concerned with the future of the environment to 
look to aesthetics for help? It would seem that what is needed is not the conso-
lation offered by edifying experience or beautiful illusion that willingly turns 
its back on ugly reality; rather, we need active intervention, based on solid 
information, which will change the world for the better. Can aesthetics, can art, 
make an effective contribution towards meeting that need? In this connection 
we should consider the following: why, if the problems that face us are indeed 
so evident, do our responses remain so half-hearted? The main problem would 
not seem to be a lack of information. To change the way we relate to the en-
vironment we need more than just cold reason: we need to experience what 
transcends the reach of such reason. What is required is a change of heart. But 
how do hearts change? Here an environmental aesthetics can make a contribu-
tion, but an aesthetics so fundamentally transformed that we may well wonder 
whether aesthetics remains an appropriate name. Schiller‘s Letters on the Aes-
thetic Education of Man provides some significant pointers. We are also in 
need of a changed understanding of art and its relationship to nature.
keywords Kant, Hegel, natural beauty, art and nature, environmental aes-
thetics, climate change
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What need is there for an environmental aesthetics? The answer to that 
question is by no means obvious. To be sure, that we need to protect our 
environment has become a cliché that I am just a bit wary about repeat-
ing it here – the statement hardly bears much discussion any longer. Is 
it not obvious that we need to make sure that all those natural resources 
on which we depend for our survival will continue to be available, not 
just to us, but to future generations? And when we think here of natural 
resources, we should consider them in the widest possible sense so that 
they include what the ancients thought of as the four elements, air, water, 
earth and fire. And here I invite you to think of them in their modern 
transformations. Even space has become an increasingly scarce resource. 
But if all this is indeed obvious, if the facts today speak loudly enough, it 
is not at all clear why we should be in need of an environmental aesthet-
ics? What, if anything, does aesthetics have to contribute to our attempt 
to meet the environmental problems we face?
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A brief look at how aesthetics has evolved ever since Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten founded this philosophical discipline in his dissertation, 
Meditationes de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus of 1735, and coined the 
term, suggests: very little. Environmental concerns, important as they are, 
not only have been given little attention by aesthetics, but it is not clear 
what sense aesthetics, as it has evolved, can make of an environmental 
aesthetics. Should such an aesthetics look at the environment through the 
lens provided by the work of art? The fact that aesthetics has had so little 
to say about the environment should give us pause. Is this just a matter of 
neglect of an important topic or is there something about aesthetics that 
renders the very idea of environmental aesthetics problematic? 
Consider, for example, the beginning of Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthet-
ics – with good reason Heidegger called them the “most comprehensive 
reflection on the nature of art that the West possesses”1: 
The present course of lectures deals with ‘Aesthetics’. Their subject is the wide 
realm of the beautiful, and more particularly, their province is Art – we may 
restrict it indeed to Fine Art.2
We should note the restriction: nature, the natural environment, is hard-
ly a proper subject for aesthetics, as Hegel understood it. The proper 
province of aesthetics is Fine Art. And Hegel did not think his restriction 
of the discipline to Fine Art at all arbitrary, but took it to be demanded by 
the very nature of “aesthetics.” 
And did he not have good reason to exclude the beauty of nature from 
his Aesthetics? Hegel justifies this exclusion by insisting that “the beauty 
of art is the beauty that is born – born again, that is – of the mind; and 
by as much as the mind and its products are higher than nature and its 
appearances, by so much the beauty of art is higher than the beauty of 
Nature. Indeed, if we look at it formally, i.e. only considering in what 
way it exists, not what there is in it, even a silly fancy such as may pass 
through a man’s head is higher than any product of nature.”3 The young 
Hegel’s response to the Alps is telling: 
Neither the eye nor the imagination finds in these formless masses any point 
on which it could rest with pleasure or where they might be engaged or find 
something to play with. Only the mineralogist finds here material for insufficient 
conjectures concerning the revolutions of these mountain ranges. Reason finds 
in the thought of the permanence of these mountains or in the kind of sublim-
ity that is ascribed to them nothing that impresses it, that demands wonder and 
admiration. Seeing these dead masses gave me nothing but the monotonous and 
in time boring idea: this is the way it is.4
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Nature is thought here, in a characteristically modern fashion, to be 
mute material to be understood, appropriated, and used by us as we see 
fit. A crystal can be called beautiful, but the beauty of its geometric faces 
is really the product of our own spirit, which recognizes in their geometry 
something of itself. With greater justice a city, or just a ploughed field, 
can be called beautiful, for in both cases human beings have labored 
to impose an order on matter. Nature has been subjected to the human 
spirit. Considered just in itself, Hegel insists, nature cannot be consid-
ered beautiful.
Mind, and mind only, is capable of truth, and comprehends in itself all that is, 
so that whatever is beautiful can only be really and truly beautiful as partaking 
in this higher element and as created thereby. In this sense the beauty of nature 
reveals itself as but a reflection of the beauty which belongs to the mind, as 
an imperfect, incomplete mode of being, as a mode whose really substantial 
element is contained in the mind itself.5
Hegel knows of course that human beings are more than just minds. 
They, too, are animals and as such part of and dependent on nature. But 
if human beings are animals and as such part of nature, they are animals 
that by virtue of their reason raise themselves above nature, become 
conscious of it, experience it, including their own nature, as not simply 
given, but as material to be understood, shaped, and bent to their will, 
instructed by their reason. Their spirit places human beings in opposi-
tion to nature, even their own nature, and demands mastery over it. In 
something as simple as a child throwing stones into the water and en-
joying the rings formed, Hegel finds evidence of this drive. Already in 
such childish play human beings seek to appropriate the natural given 
by transforming it in their own image, and this means first of all in the 
image of the human spirit. History is understood by Hegel as the prog-
ress of such appropriation; our modern age as the culmination of that 
process. Have we not come close today to realizing the Cartesian promise 
that our science and technology would render us the masters and pos-
sessors of nature? 
Art, too, is part of the effort to make the natural and sensible our 
own, to rob it of its character of being a mute, alien other by investing it 
with the aura of the human, and thus to help transform the earth into a 
dwelling place fit for human beings, into something that deserves to be 
called home. The goal of art, too, is such a humanization of the sensible, 
where humanization here means spiritualization. So understood, art in 
its origin, where Hegel is thinking first of all of architecture, prefigures 
Karsten Harries
10
technology, which allows for an ever more effective mastery of nature 
and for that very reason eventually must take its leave from art, overtake 
it, and leave it behind. Thus left behind, art in turn takes its leave from 
magic and religion, as it ever more decisively turns its back on reality, 
creating a second reality. So understood, the progress of spirit leads art 
inevitably towards art for art’s sake. Instead of promising mastery of 
the world, it now promises the creation of a second reality that, imbued 
with spirit by spirit, offers us compensation for the muteness of spirit-
less nature.
Here we have a key to Hegel’s thesis of the death of art in what he took 
to be its highest sense. Closely linked to religion and magic, art once was 
experienced as a privileged mode of revealing what most profoundly 
mattered. For us moderns, art has lost this function. We no longer fall 
on our knees before sculptures or statues. The evolution of spirit has 
reached a point where the claims of art to provide a privileged access to 
truth can no longer be taken seriously. What does truth matter to art for 
art’s sake? What does art still have to contribute towards the solution of 
the urgent problems we all face? 
Hegel’s understanding of the progress and end of art was hardly de-
rived from a careful examination of the evidence provided by the history 
of art. It represents rather an, at times, willful fitting of the evidence into 
a schema that he derived from his own determination of the essence of 
art and its place in the progress of spirit. But regardless of details, in its 
essentials that determination is difficult to get around. If we grant Hegel 
that history has been ruled by the progress of spirit and freedom, do we 
not grant him the substance of his case? If the progress of spirit demands 
that the individual liberate him- or herself ever more decisively from 
the accidents of whatever happens to be the case, then our real home 
should not be sought by looking to nature, say by looking to the aura of 
some particular place and its genius loci. Must our real home not be a 
spiritual home to which nothing sensible can finally do justice? Our en-
vironment comes closest to meeting this demand when we experience it, 
not as nature, but as artifact. Consider in this connection the widespread 
insistence on the inessential nature of what is considered the accident of 
location, birth, gender, and race. Is the attempt to discover one’s home in 
a particular landscape not born of a nostalgia that we should not allow 
to rule our lives and build us our homes? And is the same not true of 
our bodies? This at least was what the French concept artist, who calls 
herself Saint Orlan, tried to prove when, with the help of plastic surgery 
and psychotherapy, she tried to remake herself into an altogether new 
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person and wanted the French government to officially recognize the 
change. And would that not mean true autonomy, freedom finally no 
longer limited by any supposedly natural givens? The Enlightenment 
gave birth to the confidence that, bound ever more only by the author-
ity of our own reason, we moderns find ourselves on the threshold of 
true autonomy. Our aggressive appropriation and transformation of the 
environment appears from this perspective as but an aspect of human-
ity’s coming of age. Are there not many today, who feel already more at 
home in cyberspace than in any natural environment? So understood, 
environmental problems need of course to be assessed, confronted, and 
addressed. We still depend on the earth. This we will not be able to deny. 
But such dependence should be accepted and dealt with as a fact, and not 
invested with a spiritual aura. We should look to science and technology 
for solutions, not to art. What then do we have to learn from aesthetics?
St. Orlan’s attempt to remake herself into a new person, is an extreme 
expression, perhaps a reductio ad absurdum, of the spirit of the En-
lighten ment in that it raises the question: what content can we give to 
the I that here seeks to become another? Autonomy means giving one-
self the law that determines what is to be done. But where does a spirit, 
which looks at all natural givens as material to be manipulated, find that 
law? In pure reason?
2
Anyone with an interest in developing an environmental aesthetics has 
to take issue with Hegel. And not just with Hegel, but with a way of think-
ing about beauty that is as old as Plato. Consider this passage from Plato’s 
Philebus, a passage that makes me think of an artist like Mondrian:
I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, 
which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but says the argument, un-
derstand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures, 
which are formed by turning lathes and rulers and measures of angles – for 
these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are 
eternally or absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike 
the pleasures of scratching.6 
The beauty of animals or pictures is here contrasted with the beauty of 
simple inorganic forms, above all the beauty of circle and sphere, the most 
potent figures of plenitude; theirs is a beauty that is created, not by the 
body, but by the spirit. Indeed, in creating such beauty, the body is likely to 
prove a hindrance. Try to draw a straight line with your free hand.
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This Platonism has surfaced again and again, especially in the twen-
tieth century. It came indeed close to evolving into the aesthetic of the 
modern movement. Mondrian deserves special mention in this connec-
tion, as do Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, and Le Corbusier among archi-
tects. Here, a statement from Corbusier’s and Ozenfant’s programmatic 
essay “Purism”: “Nothing is worthwhile which is not general, nothing is 
worthwhile which is not transmittable. We have attempted to establish 
an aesthetic that is rational and therefore human.”7 Quite in the spirit 
of Plato and still Hegel, what is worthwhile in art here is equated with 
what is general, rational, and can be understood by everyone. This pre-
supposes that there is a universal language of art, a language not tied to 
a particular landscape, a particular climate, but cosmopolitan in its very 
essence. Note the presupposed, but profoundly questionable equation of 
what is human with what is rational: the presupposition is that the spirit 
provides a timelessly valid vocabulary on which the artist can draw to 
generate an art that will have a truly universal and timeless significance. 
Such beauty defeats the terror of time.
What makes beauty in this sense questionable is the fact that it de-
mands a downgrading of the individual and of the body. Thus, it threat-
ens to do violence to the whole human being and elides rather than 
confronts our mortal condition. At issue here is our understanding of 
ourselves and how we should relate to nature, including our own nature: 
the problem we confront is fundamentally a problem of ethics, and at the 
center of this problem is the difficulty we have accepting our mortality.
3
In this connection it is of interest to ask: what kind of thing did Baum-
garten have in mind when founding philosophical aesthetics? When I 
ask you to think of something beautiful, what comes to mind first? You 
might think of a person, or a flower, or a work of art. In each case the ex-
perience exhibits a different structure, and we should also ask ourselves 
what the family resemblance is that lets us call each, person, flower, or 
artwork beautiful. As Hegel was to do later, Baumgarten thought it ob-
vious that aesthetics should look first of all to an artwork, in his case a 
poem.
Is it obvious? I think it important to challenge that way of thinking. I do 
not think that the focus on the artwork leads us to an adequate understand-
ing of either beauty or, in the end, even of art. In this connection it is help-
ful to contrast Baumgarten’s and Hegel’s approaches to beauty with that 
of Kant. When Kant looks for examples of something beautiful he thinks 
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first of all of beautiful nature. Invoking the medieval metaphor of the book 
of nature,8 Kant still experiences beautiful nature as preserving something 
of the aura of the sacred. What first comes to his mind is a flower. And 
Kant further insists that the beauty of art is dependent upon the beauty of 
nature, a beauty of which we are most definitely not the authors and which 
he therefore places far above all artificial beauty. And thus he insists that it 
is nature that, though the genius, gives the rule to art.9
Let me return to the metaphor of the book of nature. To liken nature 
to a book is to suggest that we experience in it something like a tran-
scendent spirit speaking to our own spirit. Experiencing beautiful na-
ture we feel at home in it. And does something of this sort not hold for 
everything that can give meaning to our lives? We begin to glimpse here 
something of the importance of nature, not just to our physical, but to 
our spiritual well being. If aesthetics has something to contribute to the 
environmental problems we face, it is to Kant that it should look rather 
than to a tradition that finds beauty first of all in the artificial, a tradi-
tion that stretches from Baumgarten to Hegel and continues right to the 




For those concerned with the future of the environment, is there, I asked, 
any reason to look to aesthetics for help? What is needed, it would seem, 
is not the consolation offered by edifying experiences or beautiful illu-
sions that turn their back on ugly reality. Rather, we need active inter-
vention, based on solid information, which will change the world for the 
better. Can aesthetics, can art, make an effective contribution towards 
meeting that need? Do we not all know what the problems are and what 
needs to be done? Our task is to do it.
Why, then, do we not do more? To change the way we relate to the 
environment we need more than just cold reason: we need to be touched 
by something that transcends the reach of such reason. Reason serves a 
narrow self-interest as readily as a concern for future generations. Our 
only hope is, I will argue, a change of heart that lets us reckon differently 
with time. But how do hearts change? It is here, I want to suggest, that 
an environmental aesthetics can perhaps make a contribution. But this 
would have to be an aesthetics that is very different from the aesthet-
ics inaugurated by Baumgarten. So different, in fact, that we may well 
wonder whether “aesthetics” even remains an appropriate name. Among 
other things, this would have to be an aesthetics that reckons differently 
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with time, that does not follow Plato and place beauty, or more broadly 
the aesthetic object, in opposition to time and therefore to nature. Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment provides some significant pointers despite its analy-
sis of the disinterested character of the aesthetic judgment, which, fol-
lowing the tradition, would have us think beauty in opposition to time. 
As does Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, so 
obviously dependent on the former. We need a different way of experi-
encing the significance of nature, which would place the beauty of nature 
above the beauty of art. An environmental aesthetics can help prepare 
for that change.
5
Given a still expanding world population, coupled with a still rising life 
expectancy and demands for an ever higher standard of living, the con-
clusion seems inevitable: the road on which the world has been traveling 
has to lead to disaster, or rather disasters. Not only the expected disasters, 
such as mass starvation, wars for land, a deteriorating environment that 
will render clean water, air, and soil, not to speak of relatively unspoiled 
nature, let alone wilderness, increasingly scarce resources. But it might 
also lead to moral disaster. And if the first threat is more obvious, the 
second seems to me equally serious.
How will we respond to ever more pressing environmental problems? 
I can envision two scenarios: one marked by an ever increasing selfish-
ness, an ever more aggressive and desperate defense of one’s own cher-
ished standard of living, which has to mean the increasing deterioration 
of what we can perhaps call our moral environment. The other marked 
by a gradually diminishing selfishness, by a gradual improvement of our 
moral environment.
The first is all too easy to envision: a brave new world, the haves are 
building fences around themselves to shut out the have-nots, hiring 
guards or armies as the case may be. The growing popularity of the self-
enclosed armed residential enclave, not only in the United States, can 
serve as a dismal prophetic emblem of a world turned into a nightmare 
by our way of life. In bad dreams I see the American landscape trans-
formed into countless condominiums, spreading across the land, from 
sea to shining sea, although on such a country God would not have shed 
his grace.
Privileged as we are to live in industrially advanced societies, can we 
intelligently wish for most of the world’s population to emulate the way 
we pursue what we take to be the good life? But if not, can we ourselves 
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in good conscience continue in that pursuit? Kant held that we are never 
to act otherwise than so that we could also will that our maxims should 
become a universal law. But if so, it seems clear that many of the maxims 
by which we govern our everyday life do not permit such generalization, 
for they are ruled rather by a selfishness that refuses to look abroad and 
to plan very far ahead. Much of our built environment, including the 
look of our cities and suburbs, presupposes such selfishness. Think of 
energy-guzzling skyscrapers or of the McMansions that we now see in 
America obscenely sprouting in suburb after suburb. As I suggested be-
fore, we need to learn to understand space, too, as a scarce resource.
But do we need to moralize? Is it not in our own best interest to pre-
serve, for ourselves and for those who will succeed us, an environment 
that will enable us to sustain the kind of life we desire for ourselves? Of 
course, the answer depends on how narrowly we are to understand per-
sonal interest. I can imagine individuals so preoccupied with themselves 
that they really feel: after me the deluge. If what I understand to be my 
personal interest is circumscribed by my life and death, then what hap-
pens to those whose lives no longer intersect with my own, those who, 
after my death, will have to cope with problems I may have helped to cre-
ate, need not concern me. This, to be sure, would be to presuppose what 
I consider an unacceptably narrow understanding of personal interest 
and of the person. I am also convinced that such a narrowly construed 
self-interest finally has to rob our own life of its value. Nihilism and such 
self-centeredness belong together. Only a very short-sighted selfishness 
will refuse to recognize that we need to consider the environment as an 
increasingly scarce resource, which by its very nature does not belong 
to me or to us, to Americans or Chinese, but to all. I also recognize, how-
ever, that someone sufficiently self-centered need not be convinced by 
my argument. That, as I claimed earlier, would require more than argu-
ment, would require a change of heart. I may judge such selfishness evil, 
perhaps even the root of all evil, but such a judgment presupposes that 
I do not understand myself as in any way a self-sufficient whole, but as 
part of something larger. And while I expect that most, perhaps all of 
you, will in some measure agree with me, I am also convinced that there 
is no argument strong enough to force a dissenting egoist to change his 
or her mind.
I said that most of you would agree with me that in order to live 
meaningful lives we must understand ourselves as parts of something 




Many of us love to wonder and worry about impending cosmic catas-
trophes, such as the ultimate fate of the sun and its consequences for our 
earth. There is indeed something sublime about such gloomy thoughts, 
which let us think of our homelessness in an uncaring universe, only to 
lead us back to our precious selves. Suppose the threat were not quite so 
far off. Some years ago there were disturbing reports of an asteroid that 
might hit the earth some time around 2032. To be sure, the probability 
was supposed to be only 1 in 100. But that still seems much too great, es-
pecially when coupled with reports that a significantly smaller asteroid 
was responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs many millions of 
years ago. Were we headed for a similar fate? Fortunately recalculations 
of the asteroid’s orbit showed that there was no danger after all.
But suppose such a collision were in fact imminent; suppose it did 
promise to put an end to humanity. Would this not have an enormous 
impact on the way we feel about ourselves and our fragile relations with 
others? To plan for the distant future would suddenly make little sense. 
The present would become more important. Carpe diem! And such cer-
tainty would also change the way we build, if indeed we retained a will to 
build at all: great architecture and city planning presuppose and speak 
of an optimism and a care that reach into a future that architects and 
city planners will no longer live to see. But what sense would it make to 
build for a future that would never arrive? Given such conviction, our 
lives would inevitably become more self-centered and present-centered. 
Ecological concerns, say, worries about global warming, would lose their 
point. We would all feel lonelier than before, even as we might turn more 
desperately to others.
To bring the point of this thought experiment into still sharper focus, 
indulge me in this science fiction. Imagine someone who had entered a 
bargain with the devil, who had promised this individual a happy long 
life followed by a good death, and had asked in return that he be allowed 
to implant a doomsday device in our Faustian hero such that his death 
would be followed immediately by the destruction of all life on this earth, 
although his own life would, by the terms of the bargain, not be shortened 
at all. Suppose you had struck such a bargain with the devil? How would 
you be affected by the knowledge that with your death all life would end, 
and all that would be left would be a lifeless earth? Now, imagine that it is 
just the end to all human life? Would you feel differently? I can imagine 
a Nero or a Hitler welcoming such thoughts. Would they be objectively 
wrong to do so? I would not hesitate to call them evil. And I find it difficult 
to imagine them in no other state than desperately unhappy.
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How would you be affected by the certainty that with your death life on 
earth would end? If you understand your own death to circumscribe what 
matters to you, why should it make any difference at all? Would your life 
not remain pretty much the same? Why should it concern you how the 
world will look after you are gone? To most of us it would of course make 
an enormous difference, which shows that we recognize that not caring 
for those who will outlive us diminishes our own life. We demonstrate 
such recognition whenever we plan for a future after our death, for ex-
ample when we take out life insurance; or when we create a work of art to 
give joy to those who will come after us; or when we plan a city. Most of 
us would not consider these irrational acts. But if we do not consider such 
acts to be irrational, it has to mean that we project ourselves beyond our 
individual lives, that we acknowledge that the meaning of our individual 
death-bound lives depends crucially on our ability to place ourselves in an 
ongoing community. And if so, would we not want, or rather, feel a duty 
towards making sure that the environment will continue to speak to us of 
such a faith in the future? But the environment speaks to us most strongly 
in this way when we experience it as nature shaped by human work re-
sponsive to it. I use “landscape” here to mean nature transformed by hu-
man work, shaped by history and by planning for the future, quite aware 
of the artificiality of such usage and without investing too much in this 
particular word. You may well come up with a happier term, but as I am 
using the word here, “landscape” is opposed to “wilderness.” What allows 
us to understand such landscapes is an ever changing figure-ground rela-
tionship: cities, villages, houses, roads, and fields present themselves as 
more or less permanent figures in the landscape. I want to claim that we 
all have a need for landscape so understood as well as a need to preserve 
it. Such figuration reinforces the legibility of the environment, makes it 
more homelike. To be sure, to a person who, to speak with Kierkegaard, 
had buried himself within himself, such landscapes, such figures of on-
going community would not matter. 
6
I suggested that an environmental aesthetics might contribute towards 
a change of heart that might make people more willing to support the 
institution of painful, but desperately needed measures to assure that 
the earth will remain a sustainable environment. What might such an 
environmental aesthetics look like? For one, it would not place artifice 
above nature. Rather it would recognize the dependence of the meaning 
of art, indeed of all meaning, on nature.
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Earlier I mentioned Kant, for whom nature still preserved something 
of the aura of the sacred. But does this not mean, one may want to object, 
that in this respect Kant still remains indebted to a fundamentally still 
medieval understanding of the beauty of nature, to which the Enlighten-
ment and indeed Kant’s own formal understanding of beauty were to put 
an end? Is any attempt to endow nature with something like the aura of 
the sacred not out of step with the spirit of modernity? I want to suggest 
that something like this is indeed what we are in need of.
Here it is instructive to consider a passage in Kant’s Critique of Judg-
ment, where he wonders how it would affect us to learn that the sound, 
which we thought to be the call of a nightingale, was in fact produced by 
a boy, who had been hired by an innkeeper on some beautiful summer 
evening in order to heighten the enjoyment of his guests.10 The assump-
tion is that what is heard remains indistinguishable from the song of the 
true nightingale. From a purely aesthetic point of view, it would seem, 
there should be no reason to rank one above the other. And Hegel might 
well have preferred the simulacrum, since it demonstrates the skill of 
the human performer. Nevertheless, Kant suggests, once we learn of the 
deception, that which we hear loses its aura; we still hear the same mel-
ody, but now without the former interest and pleasure, which shows that 
more is involved in our appreciation of beautiful nature than just the 
appreciation of beautiful forms. What matters is that these forms are ex-
perienced as products of nature, as not born of artifice. Here something 
in nature is experienced as answering to our intellect and its demands. 
Spirit without seems to speak to our own spirit. In beautiful nature we 
thus feel at home. The beauty of the environment promises a spiritual 
homecoming to the earth.
But has Walter Benjamin not taught us to recognize the self-deception 
that supports such an experience? What sense can we still make of any 
talk of the spirit dwelling in nature? A religious person may once have 
had an answer. But has the progress of science not replaced the book 
of nature with an understanding of nature as the totality of essentially 
mute facts, to be used by us as we see fit and are able? More questions 
are raised by Kant’s claim that “an immediate interest in the beauty of 
nature ... is always the mark of a good soul,” that the appreciation of the 
beauty of nature is “akin to the moral feeling.”11 How are we to under-
stand such kinship?
What links the two is that both involve something like an experience 
of an incarnation of spirit in matter. To be sure, as Kant emphasizes, our 
science can know nothing of such an incarnation. For the same reason 
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it can also not know anything of persons as persons. Freedom has no 
place in the world of science. And yet the experience of persons as re-
sponsible agents is a presupposition of any ethics. Morality presupposes 
an experience of others as persons deserving respect. But this is to say 
that we must be able to experience persons as more than just objects 
among objects, say as robots governed by computers so complicated that 
they successfully simulate human intelligence. The other must present 
him- or herself to me as spirit incarnated in this particular matter. To 
experience such an incarnation is to experience a person’s special aura. 
Were I to learn that what I took to be a person were just some mechanical 
reproduction, I would no longer experience the aura that alone lets me 
recognize the other as a person, like myself. I would lose what allows me 
to know that I am not alone.
But even if we grant that the recognition of persons presupposes an 
experience of aura that is more than just a registration of mute facts, that 
here we experience incarnations of spirit in matter, what justifies Kant’s 
claim that recognition of beauty in nature, too, presupposes an openness 
to some spirit transcending our own? Kant might have answered that 
even though science cannot know anything resembling an incarnation 
of spirit in matter, its pursuit of truth nonetheless presupposes experi-
ences of the intelligibility, or as he would put it, of the purposiveness of 
nature. Kant’s theory of knowledge turns out to have its foundation in 
his aesthetics of nature. And this claim can be generalized: the Cartesian 
self-assertion that lets human beings oppose themselves to nature as its 
masters and possessors presupposes, not just sensation, but a perception 
of significant patterns or family resemblances, as Schopenhauer, and 
following him, Wittgenstein were to put it. All concept formation pre-
supposes perceptions of meaning in matter, of meaning that cannot be 
manu factured, but must be received as a gift. There is thus an intimate 
link between my ability to appreciate the beauty of the natural environ-
ment and my ability to experience the other as a person. Both are percep-
tions of spirit incarnated in matter, answering to our own spirit. Both 
give us to understand that we are not lost in the world, but at home in it. 
Both persons and nature demand respect.
One might want to say at this point about nature something analogous 
to what Benjamin had to say about art in the age of its technical repro-
ducibility: is the loss of aura not demanded by the spirit presiding over 
our age? Benjamin would seem to affirm this loss as a necessary byprod-
uct of the progress of technology; and does technology, by promising to 
render us masters and possessors, not just of nature without, but of our 
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own nature, not also promise true autonomy and happiness to all? This, 
to be sure, presupposes, as Benjamin reminds us, that a society is “ma-
ture enough to incorporate technology as its organ,”12 instead of allowing 
technology to become an instrument used by those in power to reduce 
human beings to human material. 
But how are we to acquire the needed maturity? Reason alone has 
proved unable to secure it. In this connection it is interesting to note 
that Benjamin, too, found it difficult to let go of the aura, which, in “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” he seems so ready 
to relegate to a never to be recovered past. In that essay this is hinted at 
through an example, in which it is significant that it is taken not from 
art but from nature: “If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow 
with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts 
its shadow over you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that 
branch.”13 Mountains or that branch hint at some elusive magical other. 
The seen material object is experienced as a figure of utopia. 
Is it this figural significance of the perceived that the word “aura” is 
here meant to capture? The Greek “aura” meant “breath” or “breeze”; the 
Latin “aura” a gentle wind or current of air; and “aura” thus came to name 
the subtle emanation of some substance, for example the special odor of 
a rose. In this sense, an artificial rose can be said to lack the aura of the 
original. In all these cases, “aura” names a perhaps elusive, but definitely 
physical phenomenon, which can in principle be measured. Aura here 
has a material basis. That basis became more elusive, was spiritualized, 
when aura came to be understood in the 19th century as a subtle emana-
tion around living beings. In that sense, one might speak of the special 
aura issuing from a charismatic person or from someone we love. And 
is there not a similarity between the aura of the beloved and the aura of 
that distant mountain range?
For Benjamin the paradigm behind all experiences of aura is the ex-
perience of another person: “Looking at someone carries the implicit ex-
pectation that our look will be returned by the object of our gaze. Where 
this expectation is met which, in the case of thought processes can apply 
equally to the look of the mind and to a glance (pure and simple), there 
is an experience of the aura to the fullest extent.”14 There is a profound 
difference between experiencing the gaze of the other and experiencing 
the aura of a writer or a composer in one of his or her creations. When I 
experience the other person, the experience of his or her distinctive aura 
is the experience of an incarnation of spirit and matter so complete that 
there is no distance between the two. The mystery of aura is the mystery 
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of such incarnation, which is fully realized when two lovers look into 
each other’s eyes: “The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked 
at, looks at us in return.”15 But something of the sort is present in every 
experience of aura: to experience the aura of something is to experience 
it as if it were another person, capable of speech. Benjamin no doubt 
would have us underscore the “as if”: “Experience of the aura thus rests 
on the transportation of a response common in human relationships to 
the relationship between the inanimate or natural object and man.”16 On 
this interpretation it is the human subject who invests an essentially 
mute nature with something like spirit or soul. But should we who are 
truly of this modern world not recognize that such an investment is at 
bottom a self-deception? Today, a child may still experience rocks and 
animals as animate, endowed with the power of speech; and fairy tales 
preserve traces of an older magical experience of the aura of all things. 
But is a presupposition of our science and technology not a reason, which 
has to render nature mute and meaningless? Such a reason cannot make 
sense of the phenomenon of aura except as a projection of meaning into 
matter, which, as such, lacks meaning. And are human beings not part 
of nature? The question returns us to Nietzsche’s pronouncement in The 
Birth of Tragedy that only as an aesthetic phenomenon can human exist-
ence be justified.
What allows us, or Benjamin, in this age of the technical reproduc-
ibility, not just of works of art, but increasingly of everything, to hold on 
to a fundamental distinction between the aura of human beings and the 
aura of works of art and natural objects? Are human beings today not 
in danger of losing that special aura, which distinguishes persons from 
their simulacra? Think of artificial hearts! Of cloning! What, in principle, 
distinguishes a person from a robot with a computer brain?
7
One final comment. Returning once more to the title of this article: what 
need is there then for an environmental aesthetics? An environmental 
aesthetics, I have here suggested, is needed to help pry open a window 
or door in the architecture that the reason, which rightly rules over our 
science and technology, has built us; a window to a dimension of our 
experience and of reality that transcends the reach of such reason. I do 
not have time here to develop the suggestion that the environmental 
problems that we face similarly call for an aesthetic education. So let 
me conclude by returning to the definition of beauty as the object of 
love that Plato offers us in the Symposium. To experience the beauty of 
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our environment is to love it somewhat as we love a cherished person. I 
was thinking of such a love when I was speaking of the change of heart 
required if our measures to protect the environment are not to remain 
half-hearted and insufficient.
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